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Originally Posted by theapportioner
Another thing that's sort of unclear to me is how we should take Sartre's notion of free will. Is it to be understood only in the context of not being dragged down by being-in-itself? In other words, free from representation? I have heard he rejects determinism, but in a subjective sense only or also in an objective sense?
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It seems to be a very radical sort of free will. I know that he rejects any sort of "human nature," believes that our choices shape what we are, and seems to think that our biological wants and needs are, for the most part, under the control of consciousness. I know Nietzsche accepted a more compatibilist view of determinism and free will, thinking that while we can make choices, the idea that there aren't subtle internal or external forces influencing us is absurd. Sartre, on the other hand, doesn't seem to make any concessions to determinism, but it's been awhile since I've read
Being and Nothingness, so I'd have to double-check.
The basic drive of being-for-itself, he says, is to become "God"--a complete entity lacking nothing yet possessing cognition and subjectivity at the same time. Since consciousness itself is a lack, says Sartre, such a quest is futile. Attitudes towards others mirror this desire for "completeness." His concept of sexual desire, for example, places less emphasis on biology than it does on his belief that being-for-itself attempts to "possess" and merge with another subjective lifeform.
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Yeah, but our emotional states influence our thoughts, too.
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True.
EDIT: Well, the Nietzsche position on the free will debate seems pretty clear on second thought:
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Originally Posted by Nietzsche
The error of free will. Today we no longer have any pity for the concept of "free will": we know only too well what it really is--the foulest of all theologians' artifices aimed at making mankind "responsible" in their sense, that is, dependent upon them. Here I simply supply the psychology of all "making responsible."
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