http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/22/op...rint&position=
Turning Friend Into Foe in Baghdad
By ASLA AYDINTASBAS
Thursday's raid on the Baghdad home of Ahmad Chalabi, the Iraqi Governing Council member who for more than a decade was America's staunchest ally among the Iraqi resistance, is the latest bit of madness in the bungled occupation of Iraq. Unable to protect the lives of the governing council members — who, whatever one thinks of the body, are the only representative voices in Iraq — the Coalition Provisional Authority has now apparently decided to humiliate any who have the temerity to criticize its plans.
The Americans are claiming that Mr. Chalabi passed secret intelligence to Iran. This may or may not be true — he has long had ties to the Tehran government — but in any case it provides a convenient excuse to pin all the occupation's failings on him. No weapons found? It must be because of bad intelligence fed to the Pentagon by Mr. Chalabi's political group, the Iraqi National Congress. Terrorism on the rise? Must be because the Baath Party and the military were disbanded after the war at Mr. Chalabi's insistence. The growing insurgency? It would not have happened had Mr. Chalabi not told us that American troops would be welcomed with flowers.
Finding a scapegoat in an election year is a boon to the Bush administration. And silencing Mr. Chalabi is also essential for garnering United Nations cover for the June 30 transfer of sovereignty in Iraq. Mr. Chalabi has been the most outspoken critic of the plan of Lakhdar Brahimi, the United Nations envoy, for a new transitional government. He also insisted on pushing ahead with the investigation of the United Nations oil-for-food program, which is highly embarrassing to Mr. Brahimi's colleagues in New York.
Mr. Chalabi's rabble-rousing has also angered the occupiers. When the Coalition Provisional Authority decided to ease its screening process of former Iraqi military and Baath Party officials, he likened it to re-employing the Nazis in Germany. More important, he insisted on a full transfer of sovereignty on June 30 — including Iraqi control over the country's military and finances.
I met Ahmad Chalabi in London in the early 90's, when he was enjoying American support in his efforts to organize the overthrow of the Iraqi regime. He was unconventional, compelling and upfront. I was very rough with him in my first interview. But he eventually convinced me, and many others, of our individual moral responsibility to aid in the liberation of Iraq. Over the years I have seen him fighting alongside the Kurds in northern Iraq, organizing opposition conferences around the world, lobbying Congress for aid and, starting with the American decision to drop its backing of his insurgency plans in 1995, bitterly clashing with the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency.
This bureaucratic feud was so entrenched that when I visited Baghdad in the early months after the collapse of the regime, I was horrified to see how much time and energy went into interagency fighting. Despite the news media's portrayal of Mr. Chalabi as "Washington's favorite Iraqi," it was obvious that L. Paul Bremer, the American proconsul in Baghdad, was doing his utmost to limit his influence. Within the governing council, Mr. Chalabi was highly effective, the go-to guy for the occupation forces whenever there was a problem. But at the same time, Mr. Bremer's staff worked hard to undermine Mr. Chalabi — haggling with him over government jobs; cutting off his communications with Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy secretary of Defense; and eventually eliminating direct aid to the Iraqi National Congress.
Vacillating between liberation and occupation, American rule in Iraq has created a power vacuum. You feel this in Baghdad. The Americans micromanage the governing council, deny Iraqis a voice, live in secluded compounds, make exclusive decisions on contracts, and push away secular liberals like Mr. Chalabi in favor of Shiite clergy and former Baathists.
Yesterday an aide to a governing council member in Baghdad told me over the phone, "If they can do this to Ahmad, what will they do to us?" By alienating Ahmad Chalabi, the United States has not only lost its key liberal supporter in Baghdad. It has also won a formidable foe.
There is no such thing as partial sovereignty. Disillusioned by America's ability to deliver peace and freedom, most Iraqis now demand elections and full control of their destiny. I called Francis Brooke, a Chalabi aide, to see if the raid had in fact increased his boss's standing among Iraqis. "Sure, our popularity is skyrocketing here," he said. "The only downside is that he might now be killed."
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Asla Aydintasbas is a correspondent for the Turkish newspaper Sabah.
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